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ON NEGATIVE THEOLOGY 
Hilary Putnam 
In addition to being arguably the greatest Jewish philosopher, Moses 
Maimonides was also the most radical of the medieval proponents of "negative 
theology". Building on some recent important work by Ehud Benor,! I propose 
to discuss the puzzles and paradoxes of negative theology not as simply pecu-
liar to Maimonides' thought, but as revealing something that can assume great 
importance for religious life at virtually any time. My discussion will begin 
with a brief review of well known aspects of Maimonides' view; following that 
I will say something about Wittgensteinian views of religious language'; then I 
will return to Maimonides' negative theology; and finally I will consider some 
philosophical criticisms, not only of Maimonides' view but of the medieval dis-
cussion as a whole. 
Maimonides' negative theology and "attributes of action" 
A puzzle which confronts any thoughtful reader of Maimonides' great 
philosophical text, The Guide of the Perplexed3 is the following: Maimonides 
emphatically tells us that no positive predicate which we are able to under-
stand can apply to God. Indeed, the more we apply such predicates -
even "Good" or "Real" - to God, thinking thereby to say something liter-
ally or even analogically true of God, we "become like one who likens him 
to other things", which is Maimonides' way of saying we become 
idolatrous.4 What leads Maimonides to this conclusion (as it led both Islamic 
and Christian theologians to much less radical forms of "negative theolo-
gy") was the familiar insistence on God's absolute unity. The following 
passage from Guide 1:50 illustrates the radicalism, as Maimonides denies 
that God possesses essential attributes: 
If .... you are one of those whose ambition it is to rise to a higher level, 
at which things are thought out, if you wish to know with certainty 
that God is truly one, in the sense that there exists no multiplicity 
whatever in Him and no capability of division in any respect, then 
you must recognize that He has no essential attributes. Those who 
believe God to be one with many attributes have affirmed his 
Oneness verbally while mentally believing Him to be many. This 
resembles the Christians' formula that "He is one but three" and that 
lithe three are one," or the dictum of those who reject anthropomor-
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phism and affirm His absolute simplicitys by saying "He is one but he 
has many attributes, He and His attributes being one" - as if our 
object were to find out what to say rather than what to believe."6 
Given all this, as Benor remarks7, it is surprising that "Maimonides per-
mits both attributes of action, and attributes of character such as 'merciful', 
'gracious' and 'long-suffering', which invoke an image of God as a moral 
person worthy of imitation." True, Maimonides qualifies this by saying 
that "the meaning is here not that He possesses moral qualities, but that He 
performs actions that in us proceed from moral qualities""; but can it be the 
case that Maimonides thought that "He performs actions" is univocal as 
applied to God and as applied to human beings? Logically speaking, if no 
attribute that we can think can be literally or even analogically predicated 
of God, then performing actions cannot be predicated of God either. This is 
the familiar antinomy of negative theology. No one supposes that 
Maimonides was unaware of it. So what is going on here? 
Wittgenstein's view of religious language 
At this point, I shall temporarily abandon the subject of Maimonides' 
thought and say something about religious language. My views are 
informed by Wittgenstein's Lectures on Religious Belief, as I interpreted 
them when I wrote Renewing Philosophy9, but I shall not repeat the exegesis 
of specific passages given there. For my present purpose, what is impor-
tant is the following: on the view I there ascribed to Wittgenstein, religious 
language and the languages of ordinary empirical description and scientif-
ic theorizing are, in a way, incommensurable. to The religious believer (qua 
religious believer) is not - or should not be - I said that Wittgenstein's 
account is a normative account, and like many normative accounts of reli-
gion involves a sharp distinction between religious belief and superstition 
- engaged in the prediction of empirical phenomena, and religious faith is 
not refuted by this or that empirical happening or scientific discovery. To 
suppose, as many people nowadays do, that "science has refuted religion", 
is to have a deeply confused understanding of what real religious belief is. 
As I emphasized in Renewing Philosophy (168 ff.), this does not mean that 
Wittgenstein was immunizing religious belief from criticism (although he 
was saying that one sort of criticism is utterly misguided). One may find 
what the believer says unintelligible: for instance, one may find that it vio-
lates one's sense of what life means; or one may find that religious belief 
has lost its hold on one (or one has lost one's hold on it), and it now 
appears as something strange and alien; but what one should not do is 
claim that one's view, whatever it is, is mandated by "present day sci-
ence"". Nor - or so I argued in Renewing Philosophy - should one hope 
that philosophy of language, or analytic philosophy, will be able to tell one 
whether religious language makes sense and, if so, what sort of sense it 
makes. There is simply no uncommitted place to stand with respect to the 
religious dimension of human life. 
Of particular importance is the following thought, which runs through 
all of Wittgenstein's philosophy: that our understanding of our language 
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consists in our ability to use it in the stream of life. Coupled with that 
thought, and closely connected with it is the idea that a given sentence or a 
given form of words may mean anything or nothing depending on the 
context in which it occurs. No sentence, in itself, mandates just one use or 
just one content. 12 But these thoughts are subject to misinterpretations 
which it is important to guard against if we are to bring them to bear on 
religious language. 
One of those misinterpretations is the idea that Wittgenstein thought of 
language as consisting of a determinate number of "language games".13 To 
be sure, Wittgenstein does often refer to some part of language (either actu-
allanguage or imagined language or even of exchanges which are highly 
problematic if thought of as possible parts of a functionallanguage14) as 
"language games". But to infer from that that the question, How many lan-
guage games does English consist of?" has a sense, or that the question "Is 
the Jewish religion (or Christianity, or Islam, or Zen Buddhism) a language 
game?" has a sense, is like supposing that because it is useful to speak of 
this or that "context", the question "How many contexts are there in the 
universe?" has a sense, or that the question "Is the Jewish religion a con-
text?" has a sense. Like the term "context", the term "language game" sin-
gles out a part of language for a certain kind of attention, but neither has a 
determinate denotation apart from a context of use. 
An even more unfortunate misinterpretation, one that piggybacks on 
the misinterpretation just described, is the idea that Wittgenstein was say-
ing that religious utterances are true by convention in certain self-enclosed 
"language games" (so that "God exists" is supposed to be true by conven-
tion in certain traditional religous "language games" somewhat as it is true 
by convention - the conventions of chess - that one does not check the 
queen). This interpretation, although it has been put forward by some, 
seems to me a travesty of Wittgenstein's thought. As Cora Diamond right-
ly says in the course of her discussion of Anselm's argument, 'The ques-
tioning expressed in great riddles is anyone's; the possibility of such ques-
tions belongs to language itself, and not to any particular language game. 
The tendency to ask them does not depend on any form of life other than 
speech itself; it is as much something primitive, something given .... as 
responding to other people (and is indeed found in small children)."!5 
What then can we say about the intelligibility of religious language? In 
one sense, there is no question of its intelligibility. Religious forms of life 
are a standing possibility for us (if not for everyone, for almost everyone, at 
least at some point or other in life). Even those who cannot or will not 
make them their own can, if they are intelligent and sympathetic, enter into 
them imaginatively as William James did in the Varieties of Religious 
Experience. It is through the ways in which religious language develops and 
is articulated in the life of religious communities and in the lives of reli-
gious individuals that it gains its intelligibility. If religious belief is con-
fused or a kind of confusion - as has, of course, been charged again and 
again - it is neither a confusion about the grammar of our concepts nor a 
scientific confusion. If it is a confusion, it is a confusion, one might say, 
about existence as a whole, and the conviction that it is that sort of confu-
sion is, one may say, a religious conviction as much as what it denounces. 
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But, of course, the fact that religious belief is different from philosophical 
confusion and from scientific confusion does not, in and of itself, show that 
it isn't, in this more profound sense, a confusion (or a wish-fulfillment, or 
an attempt to escape from life - as many thinkers have charged). As I 
have already said, it is not the point of Wittgenstein's account to settle the 
question of the "validity" of religious belief. 
What does settle that question? Not, I have said, the mere fact that reli-
gious language is used, and that that use can be grasped. Religious language 
gains its meaning from the different religious forms of life, but it is not about 
those forms of life. The Object of religious belief, That Than Which Nothing 
Greater Can Be Conceived, does not simply drop out. Religious utterances are 
not empirical assertions about the religious form of life, and (as already said) 
they are not "conventions", "grammatical truths" within that form of life. 
Speaking as a believer, I of course say that what makes those utterances true, 
when they are, is directly or indirectly, their relation to God. If I were not a 
believer, I would say that nothing could make them true; for, if the assertion 
that God exists is not true, then nothing conceivable could make it true. The 
risk the believer runs is not empirical falsity (a religious belief that could be 
empirically false would be an idolatrous belief) but, as the Logical Positivists 
rightly said (though for bad reasons) "cognitive meaninglessness". 
[At this point, I ask the reader's leave for a short digression. In these 
days, "analytic metaphysicians" usually connect the possibility of "objec-
tivity" in a discourse with the possibility of construing it as "corresponding 
to reality." The possibility that, e.g., mathematical utterances or ethical 
utterances might make objective claims without being descriptions frequently 
goes missing in their ruminations. Am I saying that religious language also 
makes objective claims without corresponding to reality? 
Not at all. But must I not then claim that it describes some extraordinary 
part or region of reality? The answer is that the religious person feels that 
the Reality of God is such that not only is God not a "part" of what is ordi-
narily called "reality", but that, in comparison with the Reality of God, the 
right of what we ordinarily call "reality" to be so called is what is problem-
atic. Here we enter the problematique of the "transcendence" of God. We 
may also say that "corresponds to reality" has a wholly different meaning 
as applied to religious language, and this connects with our present topic, 
the problematic of "negative theology".] 
Last but not least - and this will bring us back to the issues with which 
we started - it is part of almost all religious forms of life to say that God, 
or whatever may be of ultimate concern in the particular religious form of 
life, is not properly conceptualizable by us. The Maimonidean way of 
expressing that fact, by saying that it is idolatrous to take the things we say 
about God - that He is "personal", or that he is "Good", or that He is "all-
powerful", or that He is "all-knowing" - as true either literally or "analog-
ically" - is, indeed, exceptionally radical; but what is behind that radical 
formulation, namely, the sense that whatever one say about God falls 
hopelessly, ridiculously, short of describing God, is almost universal. And 
it is not just that one feels (if one is religous) that one cannot express prop-
erly what one means by using the words our language provides to describe 
God; it is that one feels one cannot mean what one should mean. 
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The paradox of negative theology 
It may seem as if what I am saying, what I am claiming the believer 
wants to say at certain moments, is that there are propositions about God 
that are true, but that the believer cannot think or even understand. There 
is, however something verging on contradiction involved in the thought 
that there are propositions about X which one not only does not under-
stand, but which, by their very nature are unintelligible to one. To be sure, 
some great logicians of our own time have denied (in a different context, to 
be sure) that such a thought is contradictory. Describing Bertrand Russell's 
view in "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", 
Cora Diamond writesl6, 
.. .let us suppose that each of us is acquainted with his or her own self. 
This is a view Russell is not certain of, but treats as a serious possibili-
ty. Now consider a statement about Bismarck. Since we are suppos-
ing that Bismarck has direct acquaintance with himself, he will be 
able to use the name 'Bismarck' so that it directly designates that self. 
If he makes the statement, 'Bismarck is an acute diplomatist' or 'I am 
an acute diplomatist', his self, that he is acquainted with, is actually a 
constituent of his judgment. But you or I or anyone else can think 
about Bismarck only via some description; we are not directly 
acquainted with Bismarck's self. If we say 'Bismarck was an acute 
diplomatist", what would come out in an analysis of our proposition 
is that we are not directly designating Bismarck. We designate him 
via some description .... Because the object Bismarck is known to 
Bismarck by acquaintance, but known to us only by a description, the 
judgment we make about Bismarck is not the same as the judgment 
that Bismarck makes about Bismarck. Bismarck has available to him a 
proposition that he can understand and that we cannot. We can, 
however, know by description the proposition that Bismarck under-
standsP 
But even if Russell felt that his "theory of descriptions" had eliminated 
or resolved it, there is a paradox here.18 For what Russell is saying is that in 
addition to the judgment that Russell supposes hecan make (imagine that it 
is "The self associated with such-and-such a body is subject to a 
toothache") there is another judgment that only Bismarck can make, in 
which that same self is referred to by a logically proper name. What makes 
Russell think this is, of course, that he believes he can think a thought of 
that kind about himself (the thought he expresses when he says, "I have a 
toothache"). So he must imagine, concerning the "judgment which 
Bismarck alone can make", that it is simulataneously unintelligible to him-
self and analogous to a judgment he understands. But in what sense can the 
unintelligible be analogous to anything I understand? 
I wrote that it may seem that what the believer wants to say is that there 
are propositions about God which are true, but which the believer cannot 
think or even understand. The reason I wrote "seem" is that the problem 
the believer faces is even more radical than the one that Russell faced. For, 
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"proposition" (in the sense of meaningful assertion) is a term that refers to 
human thought and speech (although Russell's Platonism might well have 
led him to deny this). To suppose that God literally thinks in "proposi-
tiems" would be completely to reject the leading idea of negative theology, 
the idea that I have been claiming to be prefigured, though not thematized, 
in ordinary religious consciousness. There are no "propositions" about God 
that are adequate to God - that is what one is committed to if one bravely 
follows out the line of negative theology to the end, as Maimonides did. 
For Russell, there were substitutes for the judgments about Bismarck that 
were supposed to be beyond the barrier of intelligibility, substitutes that 
were supposed to be just as good in a logical sense. But no proposition that 
human beings can think can be "just as good" as the (WHAT?) that God is 
able to know about himself. In fact, God cannot -literally or analogically, 
if we follow Maimonides - "know" anything: "knowing" is also an 
attribute. Yet, as Benor points out, Maimonides does urge us to speak of 
God as an intellect. How this comes about is what we shall now examine. 
Maimonides' negative theology agnin 
I have emphasized how radical Maimonides' form of negative theology 
was. Here is another aspect of that radicality: for some medieval philoso-
phers, "existence" was simply another attribute. But if God has no attribut-
es ...... ? What should we conclude if we are forced to say that He has not 
attributes but "attributes", and that even if we use words like "Good" and 
"Exists" for these "attributes" they do not mean (anything like) what they 
mean when applied to anything else?" 
Well, in that case, the danger immediately arises that every "proof" of 
God's Existence equivocates - either on the word "exist", or on the word 
"cause", or on one of the other crucial terms. For example, the 
Cosmological Argument is accepted by Maimonides; that reason itself 
requires that there be an Unconditioned Ground for the existence of every-
thing conditioned is something a medieval philosopher cannot doubt. Yet 
the further reasoning that leads Maimonides to the conclusion that the 
Divine Unity excludes the possession of attributes may show20 that the for-
mer reasoning committed the fallacy of equivocation. These paradoxes do 
not lead Maimonides to lose his faith (just as awareness of the Liar Paradox 
does not cause present-day people to lose their faith that there is such a 
thing as truth), but rather to conclude that "the divine essence, as it is, is 
incomprehensible"21, and that "we have no way of describing Him unless it 
be through negations and not otherwise."22 
And yet, Maimonides does not tell us to stop talking about God or to 
talk about God only by way of negations. Indeed, he even tells us how to 
talk; we can, indeed we must, say that God is good.23 (In the Amidah, a 
prayer that they recite silently twice daily, traditional Jews bless God with 
the words "Blessed are you YHWH, our God, The Good is your name, and it 
is fitting to praise you." [emphasis added] ) Moreover, Maimonides advis-
es us not only to apply "attributes of action" to God, but even attributes of 
character (to think of God as the supreme intellect, for example). 
As Benor interprets what is going on here, Maimonides is not opposed 
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to our using inadequate ideas in speaking of God. What he is opposed to is 
the unknowing use of inadequate ideas. To use inadequate ideas thinking 
that one is literally describing God is to fall into idolatry. But that does not 
mean that adequate ideas are available to us; in the end, even the philoso-
pher must use the inadequate ideas, must thank God and petition God and 
praise God's Wisdom and Mercy and Goodness and Power, because those 
are the only ideas we have. Similarly, the ordinary believer, whom I have 
described as also having what we might call a moment of negative theolo-
gy in his or her religious life, cannot simply keep silent in the face of the 
unknowability of God; for the awareness of God's transcendence is only 
one facet of that life, and the other facets - the sense of the availabilitt; of 
God, gratitude to God, the sense of dependence on God, humility before 
God - require that we speak of God, however inadequate our speaking. 
What concerns Maimonides is not that we speak of God, but that we tend 
to fall into idolatry by forgetting how hopelessly inadequate that speaking 
must be. As Benor puts it: 
I carefully note here that Maimonides considers an inadequate idea 
of God to be an invention of the imagination only if it is constructed 
without prior knowledge. This leaves room for an inadequate idea of 
God to be constructed with knowledge, not as a mere product of the 
imagination. Maimonides' anthropology identifies two cognitive fac-
ulties that are capable of positing general conceptions of the world: 
an intellect that conforms to objective reality, and an imagination that 
projects a view of the world in the service of human desire. In the lat-
ter Maimonides finds the root cause of idolatry, because imaginative 
projection is uninterested in correspondence to reality. An inade-
quate idea of God constructed after knowledge has been achieved 
can no longer be considered imaginative in this sense because it 
already assumes an objective orientation of the mind.24 
Maimonides' position has often been analogized to Kant's25, and indeed 
Benor speaks of it as "constructive theology".What these positions have in 
common (if we accept Benor's reading of Maimonides) is that while indeed 
our descriptions of God may be better or worse, what makes them better or 
worse is not that any of them is more accurate, but that some of them are 
better for us, that is serve to support our morality (in Kant's view), or to pro-
duce in us religiously appropriate attitudes, e.g., reverence and humility, 
and to keep us farther from materialism and idolatry (in Maimonides' 
view). Yet, persuasive as Benor's reading is, I wonder whether in the end 
Maimonides' apparent inconsistency in this regard is not fortunate. What I 
mean by his apparent inconsistency is the fact that (as I read him) he 
appears to regularly ignote the fact that if nothing can be predicated of 
God, then we cannot even think of God as the unconditioned sufficient rea-
son for the existence of everything conditioned. That he "ignores" this is, I 
think, the reason that Maimonides allows us to use attributes of action, that 
is, to ascribe "goodness" to God in tlIe sense that the things He brings about are 
as if they were brought about by a good intelligent being. I confess that, whatev-
er Maimonides' "theory of predication with respect to God" may logically 
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have required him to maintain, what he writes seems to me to breath a 
deep conviction in the existence of a Ground of the whole created world; 
and I do not believe that, in his heart of hearts, he regarded this as just an 
idea that was good for him to have. (Indeed, it seems to me - although I 
have not been able to convince anyone else of this interpretation! - that 
Maimonides may even have exempted "is created by Him" and - "pro-
ceeds from Him" from the category of attributes altogether, and hence may 
have believed that when we say that things are created by God and that 
certain actions proceed from God we are saying what is literally true26.) 
And I speak of this inconsistency - if it is an inconsistency - as fortunate 
because I think that post-Kantian versions of negative theology often 
involve both a philosophical confusion (the notion of the Ding an sich, 
which makes all ordinary objects into "appearances") and a religious con-
fusion. The religious confusion appears when the constructive theologian 
speaks (as some present-day theologians do) of God (or of our idea(s) of 
God) as a construction.. For speaking of our ideas of God as "construc-
tions" loses the sense of them as -however imperfect -perspectives . A 
perspective on something cannot simply be "constructed"; if it is to be a 
perspective at all, it must be constrained by what it depicts and not simply 
by our moral or other needs. 
Benor brings two additional philosophical ideas to bear in interpreting 
Maimonides' view. Drawing upon some of my own work on the semantics 
of natural kind terms27 and upon Saul Kripke's work on the semantics of 
proper names,28 he endorses the view that a term can have reference with-
out being synomous with any description.29 The "proper names" of God, 
are, for Maimonides, terms of just this kind; they refer to God, but they 
cannot be "unpacked" conceptually, as conjunctions of attributes. 
However, according to Benor, Maimonides does provide what may be 
called a negative conceptual unpacking, namely by a series of negations of 
attributes. Benor goes on to explain that, according to Maimonides, the 
kind of negation of an attribute that is appropriate in the case of God can-
not be construed as an ordinary negative attribute; for example, speaking 
carefully as a philosopher, one may even say that God is not good, not 
meaning that he has the attribute of "not-goodness", i.e. that God is bad, 
but that goodness (i.e., the attribute normally referred to by the adjective 
"good") is not predicable of God. Moreover, Benor claims that 
"Maimonides held that the way of negation is sufficient and necessary to 
determine the reference of God-talk,"30 i.e., it is possible to fix the reference 
of "God" negatively, by asserting the totality of all such negations: ("God is 
not P"), one such negation for each predicate P. 
The mystery remains 
It is important, however, to keep in mind that these ideas, while they 
may be excellent as reconstructions of aspects of Maimonides' philosophi-
cal views, in no way eliminate the paradoxes I have described. I shall now 
explain why they do not. 
First of all, the contemporary semantic theorizing Benor refers to (often 
referred to as "the theory of direct reference") does, indeed, allow for the 
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possibility of names which have reference but no "intension", no descrip-
tion that constitutes their very conceptual content. But both Kripke and 
myself have had to say something about how we come to master the use of 
such names, and in that account descriptions do playa role, a role as refer-
ence fixers, even if the word whose reference they help to fix does not 
become synonymous with any of those descriptions. For example, in 
Kripke's account, a baby may be given a proper name, say "Paul". The per-
sons participating in the naming ceremony must obviously be able to pick 
out the baby that is being named, pick it out as, say "the baby being held 
by Mrs. Jones". Later on, speakers may be able to use the name without 
knowing that Mrs. Jones was present at the naming ceremony, and hence 
without knowing that that description, which (along with a number of oth-
ers) could have been used to indicate which child was being named, ever 
applied to "Paul". Some later speaker may simply intend to refer to who-
ever the speakers from whom he or she learned the relevant use of "Paul" 
in turn referred to. 
However, in the case of the word "God", or of any of the Names of God 
that Maimonides discusses (e.g., YHWH), there was never a point at which 
some human speaker was able to indicate to Whom he or she was referring 
by using a literally correct definite description.11 In the case of "God" (or 
YHWH), not only are there no descriptions available which are synonymous 
with the name; there are no descriptions available to serve as reference fix-
ers in the way in which "the baby being held by Mrs. Jones" served as a 
reference fixer. 12 How we come to understand the Name of God remains a 
mystery. It is, of course, just this mystery that what Benor calls "the way of 
negation" is supposed to resolve. 
Does the way of negation really "fix the reference of God-talk"? 
The problem of existential import, etc. 
In the case of negative specification of the reference of a name of God, 
specification by an endless list of negations, the situation is quite compli-
cated, and we shall have to consider carefully the different sorts of predica-
tions that may be involved. 
An attribution may be understood either as having or as lacking "exis-
tential import". (The medievals were frequently unclear about this.) To 
understand a positive predication, say "Pegasus is a winged horse" with 
existential import is to interpret it as meaning "Something pegasizes33 and 
is winged and is a horse"). 
On that interpretation, there are only two plausible interpretations of 
"Pegasus is not a winged horse". If this negative predication is intended as 
the negation of the corresponding positive predication, then it must be read 
as asserting "Nothing pegasizes and is both winged and a horse". On this 
reading of the negative predication, it is true (since, in fact, nothing pega-
sizes - Pegasus does not exist). Indeed, for every predicate P, "Pegasus is not 
P" is true. But, for Maimonides' theory (as reconstructed by Benor) to 
work, it needs to be the case that God is the only subject 5 such that for 
every predicate P, "5 is not P" is true. (So we had better not interpret our 
negative predications this way if we want to find a "charitable" reading of 
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Maimonides' theory.) -The second plausible interpretation of "Pegasus is 
not a winged horse" takes it, like the corresponding positive predication to 
have existential import. (The reason this is plausible is that Aristotelian 
logic seems to treat all predications as having existential import - at least 
this is the default assumption.) On this second interpretation, however, 
since Pegasus does not exist the negative predication is false. So the danger 
that "the way of negation" may fail because the name "God" (or whatever 
other name of the Deity one might substitute) might behave exactly like a 
non-referring proper name (like "Pegasus", for example) would be avert-
ed. However, it follows from Maimonides' own view (that existence is also 
an attribute, and thus not strictly speaking predicable of God) that "God is 
not P" (e.g., the philosopher's assertion that God is not - properly speak-
ing - a person) is not true if understood with existential import. So the 
problem of understand the possibility of reference to God cannot be solved 
in this way if we wish to be faithful to Maimonides. 
There is at least one more possibility, however. We might - this some-
times happens, in fact - construe a positive predication not as an existen-
tial quantification but as a universally quantified strict implication. For exam-
ple, "Pegasus is a winged horse" might be understood, not as asserting 
that Pegasus exists (in which case it would be false), but as asserting that, 
for any entity x, if x pegasizes, then (necessarily) x is a winged horse. On 
this interpretation, it is plausible that "Pegasus is a winged horse" is true, 
and "Pegasus is not a winged horse", understood as its truth-functional 
negation, is false. Maimonides' claim (restated in accordance with Benor's 
reconstruction) that the Names of God are the only subject-terms S such 
that "S is not P" is true for all attributes P now looks as if it may well be 
true. 
So far we have worried that subject-terms like "Pegasus", meaningful 
but non-referring subject-terms, might be a counterexample to this claim. 
(Referring subject terms like "Saul Kripke" cannot be counterexamples, 
because all existent things have essential properties, at least in medieval 
philosophy.) But what happens if we choose as our subject-term S a mean-
ingless name, say "Gravelboom"? Presumably "Gravelboom does not have 
P" is not true, but meaningless. So Maimonides as interpreted by Benor 
seems to be right: the Names of God are the only subject terms T such that 
all the negative predications of the form "T is not P" are true (when inter-
preted as negations of strict implications, as we suggested). But that, of 
course, presupposes that the Names are not meaningless terms. That that is 
so is not explained but rather presupposed by "the negative way". 
Philosophical answers to Maimonides 
Maimonides' radicalism did not, of course, go unchallenged. Perhaps 
the most famous of his critics was Thomas Aquinas.34 As the story is usual-
ly told, the disagreement between Maimonides and Aquinas is perfectly 
straightforward: Aquinas, although agreeing that we cannot predicate any 
attribute of God in the same (literal) way that we predicate it of a creature, 
did think that we could predicate Goodness, Power, Wisdom, Existence, 
and the rest of God by analogia, analogy. While this is not exactly false, as 
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usual, on closer examination, the situation turns out to be more complicat-
ed than this account would suggest. 
The problem has to do with the nature of analogy. Aquinas is standard-
ly held to have distinguished between two sorts of analogy, analogy of 
attribution and analogy of proportion, but this reading has recently been 
challenged by McInerny, who holds that Aquinas uses "proportion" as a 
synonym for analogy, not as a name of a kind of analogy.35 However that 
may be, here is a typical statement by Aquinas on this topic (Summa 
Theologica, la, q.13): discussing the application to God of such terms as 
"being" and "good" and "wise", after having said that these terms are nei-
ther applied univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, Thomas writes3", 
It should be said thereofre that names of this kind are said of God 
and creatures according to analogy, that is, proportion. This occurs in 
two ways in naming: either many things have a proportion to one, as 
"healthy" is said of medicine and urine insofar as each is ordered to 
the health of the animal, of which the latter is the sign and the former 
is the cause; or one is proportioned to of another, as "healthy" is said 
of medicine and animal, insofar as the medicine is the cause of the 
health that is in the animal. And in this way some things are said ana-
logically, and not purely equivocally or univocally, of God and crea-
tures. We can only name God from creatures as was said before. 
Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures is said insofar as there is 
a certain order of creature to God as to its principle and cause in 
which pre-exist in an excellent manner all the perfections in things. 
Let me simply note that the analogy between medicine and health in the 
animal that Aquinas uses in explaining the doctrine of analogical predica-
tion (in the case of God), strongly suggests that when we call God "good" 
or "wise" or a ''being'' we so refer to him not because he is good or wise or 
a being in the sense that a creature is (since these terms are not univocally 
applied to creatures and to God, even though "we can only name God 
from creatures"), but because God is the "principle" or ground of (what we 
call) goodness and wisdom and being in creatures. And this is exactly 
Maimonides' account of the attributes of actionP7 
Another kind of answer entirely, one whose possibility was not missed 
in the Middle Ages, although it was never accepted as the orthodox view 
in any of the monotheistic religions, was the answer of Nominalists and 
Conceptualists. Although there are important differences between these 
positions, what they shared was the belief that the whole "problem of the 
Unity of God", insofar as it led to paradoxes concerning the very possibili-
ty of predication, was generated by the reification of attributes. If God has 
distinct attributes, and attributes have real existence outside the mind, as 
postulated, though in different ways, by both Aristotle and Plato (and 
many fusions of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism took place, important-
ly in the Islamic philosophical world by which Maimonides was deeply 
influenced), then for God to have more than one attribute is for him to 
have a kind of internal complexity, to have different and distinguishable 
universals "in" Himself. But if, on the other hand, attributes are either just 
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names in language or just ideas in the mind, then applying as many of 
them as you like to a subject does not, in itself, imply any sort of internal 
complexity in that subject unless the attribute itself implies internal com-
plexity. So, as Gersonides for one maintained38, we should get rid of the 
whole problem of negative theology by scrapping the bad philosophy that 
led to it.3Y 
However, it seems to me that a simple rejection of the problem would 
be a profound mistake.4l) If Maimonides emphasized the error of supposing 
that one can think of God as "good" in the sense in which a human being 
may be more or less good, or as "wise" in the sense in which a human 
being may be more or less wise, or as having "power" in the sense in 
which a human being may have more or less power, this was not simply 
because he made a theoretical mistake, if he did, about the nature of predi-
cation or the problem of universals, but because he was concerned to com-
bat the temptation to what he called "idolatry" (and what we today call 
"fundamentalism"). And similarly, if Aquinas, although also concerned 
with the danger of "idolatry", wished to stress that there is a sense in 
which we can believe that God possesses wisdom and goodness and power 
and not just say (for that Maimonides certainly allowed us to do) that God 
is wise and good and powerful, it is because he was concerned to combat a 
different religious temptation, one that he saw Maimonides as succumbing 
to, which we may describe as the temptation to a mysticism that empties 
God of all content, and thereby threatens the availability of God. 
Those spiritual issues were all the more profound because the relations 
between philosophy and religion were so complex. On the one hand, 
issues which had always been philosophical issues - creation ex nihilo ver-
sus the eternity of the world, the freedom of the will, the existence of evil, 
the immortality of the soul (which might or might not be construed by a 
philosopher as what we call "personal" immortality), the nature and possi-
bility of human happiness, the relations between knowledge and virtue -
all took on added poignancy when they became fused with the concerns of 
revealed religious traditions. Conversely, revealed religion was itself 
deeply changed by its contact with Greek philosophy - such doctrines as 
the immateriality of God, the omniscience of God and the omnipotence of God 
may be, as William James said, "the product of the philosophy shop", but 
they have undeniably become part of the religious consciousness of hun-
dreds of millions of believers. 
In spite of the intimacy of these relations, there is also an obvious differ-
ence between ordinary religious belief and the religious belief of a philoso-
pher like Maimonides. On the view of religious language I earlier ascribed 
to Wittgenstein, it is not, in the end, the theories of predication of a 
Maimonides or Gersonides or Aquinas that can speak to the problem faced 
by the believer in the moment I described as having something in common 
with "negative theology". According to Wittgenstein, as I said, the intelligi-
bility of what Benor calls "God-talk" is secured by the standing possibility 
of understanding and participating in the form(s) of life with which that 
talk is interwoven - the quotidian religious forms of life - and not by the 
abstruse reasoning of Neo-Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic theology. This view 
would be out of the question for Maimonides, because of his allegiance to 
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philosophy as he conceived it, philosophy as a thousand year old way of 
life41 which holds out its own promise of a kind of salvation through philo-
sophical understanding, a promise which, alas, "the many" are not sup-
posed to be able to appreciate. Maimonides' problem was generated by his 
unique realisation that philosophy itself, the only form of religious thought 
worthy of the name, in his view, cannot reach to the comprehension of the 
Deity. His problem then becomes, as Benor describes, one of securing refer-
ence without comprehension. 
On the Wittgensteinian account, on the other hand, there is a different 
difficulty (one which pseudo-Wittgensteinian "language game theolo-
gians" seek to sweep under the rug). We may, in a sense, "understand" 
religious language through our potential for participating in the formes) of 
life which are its home, but how does that language come to connect us 
with One who transcends all our "forms of life"? There is a mystery here, I 
would say, but it is a religous mystery and not a philosophical problem 
calling for a "theory of predication". As Franz Rosenzweig held42, it is the 
"primal right" of human beings to give names, to create and speak lan-
guages - but our language is also the language that we use to speak to 
God, and that God uses to speak to us in scripture. That religious language 
COlmects us to God is something one can feel with one's whole being, not 
something that one can explain. Pace, Maimonides, it is not the theoretical 
intellect that connects us to the Divine. 
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